ABSTRACT In 2015, General Motors (GM) announced, it was reducing its powertrain warranty from five years/100 000 miles to five years/60 000 miles. GM stated that warranty coverage did not influence consumers' decision-making process when purchasing a new vehicle. However, this paper presents an alternative perspective, offering insight into GM's decision by exploring the historical trends for powertrain warranty coverage, including a timeline of events at GM, a synthesis of GM's revenue, and market share before and after its decision, analysis of the financial impact on GM of recalls leading up to the decision, and an examination of the organizational culture at GM and its influence on employee effectiveness.
I. INTRODUCTION
A warranty is a guarantee from a manufacturer to a customer that states the manufacturer's responsibility with respect to the product or service provided [1] . The manufacturer assures the purchaser that the product will function properly for a set period of time. If the product malfunctions due to manufacturing or material defects during that time, the manufacturer must repair or replace the product, or provide new parts.
Warranties have become prevalent in recent decades as new legislation requiring better consumer protection has been enacted. Most notably, in 1975 the U.S. Congress enacted the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act in response to widespread merchant misuse of express warranties and disclaimers [2] . The purpose of the Act was to make warranties for consumer products easy to understand and enforce, and to provide the Federal Trade Commission with the means to better protect consumers.
Warranties play a major role as a competitive marketing tool in the automobile industry. Manufacturers that offer longer and better warranty coverage than their competitors demonstrate confidence in their product's superior quality and reliability. Although offering more warranty coverage may provide a marketing advantage, it can also entail additional costs associated with servicing warranty claims. However, if the product's reliability is good, warranty costs are minimal.
Responsible consumer goods companies reserve a portion of their revenue to pay for anticipated warranty claims and recalls. This ''warranty reserve fund'' can be quite large, ranging from a small fraction to more than 5% of the gross revenue. Automakers are the biggest warranty spenders across all industries, and have warranty reserve funds containing billions of dollars. Unfortunately for automakers, these resources cannot be reinvested or used for programs aimed at increasing profitability and market share, such as capital improvement projects, advertising campaigns, or research and development projects, as these funds must be available to address vehicle defects. Failure to deploy these funds productively has a staggering financial effect as the automotive industry spends $12 billion annually to repair vehicles covered under warranty [3] .
Automobile warranties include basic (also known as bumper-to-bumper), powertrain, rust and corrosion, and roadside assistance coverage [4] . The powertrain warranty, usually the most scrutinized by consumers, covers almost all parts in the engine, transmission, and drivetrain [5] . All major automakers offer a two-attribute powertrain warranty based on mileage and the age of the vehicle after purchase. As soon as one of those parameters is surpassed, the warranty period ends. According to the U.S. Department of Transportation, Americans drive an average of 13,476 miles a year [6] . Thus, for a vehicle driven by one person, the standard 5 years/60,000 miles warranty will expire in approximately 4.5 years; for a vehicle shared by more than one driver, as often is the case within families, the warranty will most likely expire quicker assuming an increase in driving needs proportional to the number of drivers.
Therefore, it is perplexing that in 2015, GM cited lack of buyer interest as the reason for reducing its 5 years/100,000 miles powertrain warranty to 5years/ 60,000 miles [7] . The goal of this paper is to understand the probable reasons for GM's decision to reduce powertrain warranty coverage by (1) reviewing the historical trend for powertrain warranty coverage, (2) presenting a synthesis of GM's revenue and market share before and after its decision, (3) understanding the financial impact of recalls on GM leading up to the decision, and (4) presenting a timeline of events at GM from 2007, when its enhanced warranty was introduced, to 2015, when warranty was reduced.
II. CONSUMER INTEREST IN POWERTRAIN WARRANTIES
In 2007, GM introduced a new warranty policy that increased powertrain coverage from 3 years/36,000 mile to 5 years/100,000 miles. This was part of GM's effort to change its image as ''a carmaker that depends on cash incentives and cheap interest rates to sell cars and trucks'' [8] . At the time, GM had been losing market share to Asian competitors, and its U.S. market footprint was at an 80-year low [8] . Hence, the new warranty was part of GM's initiative to compete in the industry it once dominated.
Chevrolet and Grabowski Motor Corporation (GMC) maintained the 5 years/100,000 miles powertrain warranty until March 2015, when GM announced plans to scale back its powertrain warranty to 5 years/60,000 miles. Chevrolet and GMC vice presidents justified this reduced warranty by stating [7] :
''Through research, we have determined that when purchasing a new vehicle, included maintenance and warranty rank low on the list of reasons why consumers consider a particular brand over another. As a result, we have benchmarked our competitors, reviewed our current offerings and have concluded [these] modifications align closely with our customers' needs and expectations.'' By analyzing auto warranty coverage trends over the past couple of decades, and with the assumption that the automotive market adjusts to reflect consumer demands, GM's assertion that warranty coverage ranks low when purchasing a car can be disproven. strong warranties, as it occurred just prior to FCA's filing for bankruptcy [9] . The warranty was later reduced in 2010, with the reasoning that ''market research indicated customers prefer a warranty with a fixed time limit'' [10] . However, much like GM's situation, which will be discussed in the following sections, other factors were probably at play.
Despite warranty coverage drops between 2007 and 2017, nearly all major automakers actually increased their warranty coverage from 1997 to 2017 (except Toyota, which was already offering an exceptional powertrain warranty in 1997). If consumers ranked warranty as a low-priority factor when purchasing a vehicle, as suggested by GM, warranty coverage's would not have increased as sharply as they did for the two decades analyzed.
To further disprove GM's reasoning for its warranty changes, and to better clarify the relationship between warranty coverage and consumer purchase trends, sales data are analyzed for the years following the company's decision (2015 and 2016). If GM lost sales in a growing auto industry after its decision, then it can be inferred that consumers preferred GM for its 5 years/100,000 miles warranty to automakers that had warranties with less coverage. It is important to mention that other factors, such as the age of the vehicle model, may contribute to consumer purchase trends; however, such factors are beyond the scope of this study, but could be considered in future investigations. Fig. 1 [11] shows that since the latest economic recession ended in mid-2009 [12] , auto sales have been steadily increasing. This is due to many factors, the most notable of them being declining gas prices, overall domestic economic growth, and the $17.4 billion provided to the auto industry in early 2009 as part of the government bailout plan [13] . In addition, 2015 and 2016 both saw record-breaking sales (17.4 million and 17.5 million, respectively), which surpassed the previous record of 17.3 million sales in 2000. Table 2 shows year-to-year changes in total sales for select brands of the five major automakers from 2010 to 2016 [14] - [21] . GM's GMC and Chevrolet brands grew steadily from 2010 to 2015 (following the 2009 government bailout). In 2015, GMC, Chevrolet, and Chrysler all decreased their powertrain warranty by 40,000 miles, and sales dropped 2.2%, 1.4%, and 28.6%, respectively, the following year. On the other hand, the Hyundai and Kia brands, which have had an industry-leading 10 years/ 100,000 miles powertrain warranty since 1998, saw sales increases in 2016 of 0.8% and 3.5%, respectively. Renowned VOLUME 6, 2018 warranty expert, Wallace Blischke, attributed a quadrupling of Hyundai's sales to two key factors: its warranty and affordability [22] . Toyota and Honda, two other brands that have a reputation for reliability, also saw increases in sales during this time period. In the case for GMC and Chevrolet, the decline in sales in a growing market suggests the decision to reduce warranty coverage negatively impacted sales.
In 2009, Korenok et al. [23] analyzed the impact of ''warranty curtailments'' on GM's market share. Koronek defines warranty curtailment as a signal of decreased vehicle quality and higher maintenance costs. The study shows that ''warranty curtailments had a large and negative effect on market shares for [GM and Chrysler]'' and that ''curtailments decrease market share growth rate by more than 25 percent for each firm.'' The authors also suggest that GM and Chrysler likely strengthened their warranties in the mid2000s in response to decreased market shares. This was not the first time GM and Chrysler used warranty coverage as an incentive for buyers.
In a historical parallel, Blischke and Murthy [24] points out that in 1962, Chrysler offered a 5 years/50,000 miles warranty to ''reverse its sagging market share.'' This prompted Ford, GM, and American Motors to also expand warranty coverage, sparking ''the warranty wars.'' However, by the late 1960s, warranty-related costs were so high due to poor reliability, that automakers decreased warranty coverage. Wiener [25] explored the correlation between warranty and reliability, as well as the effect of price point and company nationality (domestic vs. foreign) and concluded ''warranty is an accurate signal of an automobile's reliability.'' Wiener's results suggest that comparing warranties between vehicles (independent of price point and company nationality) would suffice in choosing ''an automobile with above-average reliability'' if the best warranty is chosen from the sample group [25] .
Wiener's results help explain J.D. Power and Associates' 2014 Customer Service Index Study [26] , which states that the percentage of vehicle owners with complimentary or prepaid vehicle maintenance more than doubled over the previous five years. These findings belie GM's assertion that ''free scheduled maintenance and warranty coverage do not rank high as a reason to purchase a vehicle among buyers of non-luxury brands'' [27] . The study also concluded that repurchase rates were higher among vehicle owners who had complimentary or prepaid maintenance programs when compared to vehicle owners who did not receive these benefits (72% vs. 62%, respectively) [26] . These conclusions reinforce the Federal Trade Commission's estimate that 75% of consumers ''would pay a premium for products with better warranty terms'' [28] . By contrast, warranty coverage deemed insufficient by consumers will have ''a negative effect on the consumer's appreciation'' for that product [28] .
These studies, along with warranty trends, historical parallels, and marketing and sales numbers, contradict GM's claim that consumers do not value warranties or factor them into their decision-making process when purchasing a vehicle. This implies that GM had alternative motives for reducing its well-advertised 5 years/100,000 miles powertrain warranty, such as cost pressure due to recalls and reliability issues, which are discussed in the next section.
III. GM's RECALLS LED TO REDUCED POWERTRAIN WARRANTY
In the years leading up to GM's warranty reduction in 2015, GM experienced a string of recalls and increased manufacturing problems at its factories. A number of independent consumer reports show that GM automobiles produced between 2011 and 2014 were plagued with quality and reliability issues. The ubiquity of defective GM automobiles can also be attributed to GM's delayed response to correcting problems after they are identified in the field. Jelani Ellington, a former GM Warranty Reduction Leader, mapped GM's warranty system in the mid-2000s. He discovered that it took a minimum of 209 days from the time a consumer reports a failure, to when a corrective action solution is implemented; this accounts for at least 57% defective yearly output assuming a 365-day production year. Ellington estimates that GM's protracted corrective action process allows 134,000 vehicles to be manufactured with the defect before the issue is contained [29] . Subsequently, three different 2014 GM automobiles reviewed by Car and Driver magazine experienced catastrophic engine failure. When pressed by the magazine, GM's chief engineer stated that 30 other customers had also experienced similar engine failures and all had received new engines under GM's 5 years/100,000 miles powertrain warranty. The failures were caused by bad connecting-rod bearings that were not caught by the quality control procedures at one of GM's suppliers [30] . The Car and Driver editors also experienced a litany of engine-related malfunctions when reviewing the 2014 Chevrolet Corvette. Within 6,000 miles of use, the Chevrolet engines experienced catastrophic failure and were replaced under the powertrain warranty. GM later claimed that oil-filter contamination was the cause of the failure [31] .
GM's decision to reduce its powertrain warranty came one year after the automotive industry experienced its highest number of recalls. The number of vehicles recalled in 2014 (30.4 million) was more than three times higher than the previous six years combined (9 million) (Fig. 2 [32] , [33] ). The cost of the recalls was reported to be $4.1 billion in 2014 and consisted of repairs, victim compensation, and other expenses [33] . This figure represents a nearly 450% increase from warranty costs in 2013 [34] . When comparing recall costs against the quarterly profits released by the company, there were essentially no net profits for GM's first two quarters of 2014. As a result, GM recorded its lowest net profit in 2014 since 2009, when the company filed for bankruptcy.
On jarring road conditions that caused the engine to shut off and prevented airbag deployment in the event of a crash. As a penalty, GM was fined $35 million by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) [35] . By the end of June 2014, this issue was responsible for 16 deaths and recalls of over 7.6 million GM cars [36] .
Also in June 2014, GM recalled 467,000 2014 and 2015 Chevy Silverado, GMC Sierra, Chevy Tahoe, and GMC Suburban models due to transmission failures [37] . According to the NHTSA, a software glitch was to blame for what ''may result in an unintentional shifting of the transfer case into the neutral position'' [38] . The affected vehicles experienced unexpected ''roll-aways'' or loss of power [39] .
For another incident of transmission failure in 2014, GM recalled 90,750 Cadillac ATS and CTS sedans due to the shift cable becoming disengaged from the shifter or transmission bracket [40] . This issue had the potential to prevent the driver from shifting in or out of gear and from reliably placing the car in ''PARK.'' By the end of 2014, GM had issued recalls for 30.4 million vehicles -which was 3.5 times more than Fiat Chrysler, the automaker with the second most recalled vehicles in 2014 [33] , [41] . This is a stark difference when compared to GM's less than 1 million recalled units in all of 2013. GM disclosed that it was accruing funds to pay for future recalls in the third quarter of 2014, allocating $874 million as a ''catch-up accrual'' for vehicles already sold [42] . Claims, accruals, and warranty reserves are distinct but related metrics. Claims are instances where the manufacturer is partially or completely liable for servicing its product while still under warranty. Accruals are made at the time of sale, with the manufacturer setting aside an amount of money deemed sufficient to pay for future claims while under warranty. Warranty reserves act like a savings account, with the balance rising and falling as accruals are added and claims are paid.
Historically, global warranty and recall claims for original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) have amounted to approximately 1-3% of revenue. Figure 3 shows GM's warranty claim and recall expenses from 2010 to 2014 in total dollars (bars) and as a percentage of revenue (line). The massive volume of warranty claims and recall expenses took an additional 1% of revenue in 2014 and reduced GM's profit margin fivefold. The increase in warranty claims and recall expenses mirrored by a reduced profit margin suggests GM did not cut funding in any key programs during this period. A study by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) [43] confirms consistent spending on research and development from 2012 to 2015.
In 2014, with warranty claims and recall expenses amounting to over $4 billion, GM made a decision to decrease its powertrain warranty coverage, in turn, limiting future warranty claims.
IV. TIMELINE OF EVENTS THAT LED TO GM's PROBLEMS WITH PRODUCT RELIABILITY
GM's record recall rate can be traced back to its poor leadership decisions, the global financial crisis, and intense international competition. This section discusses the timeline of events that led GM to this state (Fig. 4) , and to the decision to reduce its improved powertrain warranty offering as an attempt to save money.
From 2005 to 2014, GM underwent constant executive turnover, recalls, and turmoil. GM went from being a leader in the automotive industry and making huge profits in the late 1990s, to requiring government financial assistance after filing for bankruptcy in 2009. Rick Wagoner was GM's CEO from 2000 until 2009 when he was asked to resign by President Barack Obama [44] . During Wagoner's tenure, GM's issues began to mount as the nation's largest automaker suffered losses of more than $82 billion from 2004 to 2009, and a 95% decline in the company's share price since 2000 [44] .
Wagoner blamed the revenue losses on a ''huge legacy cost burden'' consisting of billions of dollars owed to retired autoworkers' healthcare and pension payments [45] . To combat rising costs, GM instituted cuts to its retiree pension and labor union plans. Wagoner also implemented a number of dealer incentive programs and rebate plans to boost sales.
However, GM continued to lose revenue year after year and, in turn, its market share began to shrink. As shown by Fig. 5 , most of its market share was lost to international competitors, such as the Japanese automakers Toyota and Honda. GM relinquished the title of the world's largest automaker to Toyota in 2008 [46] . By 2010, a year after Wagoner stepped down as CEO, GM controlled approximately 18% of the U.S. market, 10% less than when he was appointed CEO [47] .
GM also experienced pressure from another Asian automaker, Hyundai. The South Korean-based automaker had seen success by offering a widely publicized, 10 years/ 100,000 miles powertrain warranty since 1998. After experiencing staggering financial losses, GM responded by offering its own 5 years/100,000 miles powertrain warranty in 2007.
GM's move to this expensive warranty offering occurred right before a worldwide recession took effect in 2008. With restricted credit markets and correspondingly fewer automobile loans, global automobile sales drastically decreased. The decreased sales caused considerable financial burdens for GM in Europe. In the second quarter of 2009, GM announced a 20% decrease in sales in the region, slightly more than the 18% decline in the overall European market [48] .
Following dramatic drops in automobile sales in 2008 and 2009, GM underwent a major restructuring effort to avoid bankruptcy by reducing costs by $15 billion. High fuel prices and a shift in consumer interest away from low miles-pergallon (mpg) trucks and vehicles necessitated the restructuring, which culminated in GM's selling of its Hummer brand, among others [49] . GM also scaled back production at several of its North American plants. A large part of the restructuring plan was a workforce reduction, which targeted both salaried and hourly workers, resulting in layoffs of 47,000 employees, nearly 20% of GM's workforce [50] . The salaried employees who remained endured a 30% reduction in wages and the elimination of an incentive compensation program.
These cuts, however, were not enough to keep the company solvent, and GM filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection four months later. To prevent more job losses and the destabilization of the entire North American manufacturing sector, the U.S. government invested $51 billion in GM ($49.5 billion to GM and $1.5 billion to GM's suppliers, financial arm, and warranty programs) [51] to support its restructuring, including the elimination of legacy debt.
Following the bailout, the new GM shed 14 factories, 2,400 dealers, and, crucially, $79 billion in debt [52] . With financial burdens removed, and surging fuel prices caused by the 2003-2008 energy crisis, GM turned its focus toward producing hybrid and fuel-efficient cars. In 2010, Chevrolet launched its versions of fuel-efficient vehicles, the Volt and a revamped Cruze, to better compete against the likes of Toyota's Prius, which were rapidly acquiring U.S. market share. GM had to add a third shift to a plant in Lordstown, Ohio to manufacture the Cruze. This was a dramatic turnaround in production for the plant, having operated at one 8-hour shift during the recession.
However, the restructuring (production scale-down, plant closures, employee layoffs), followed by a rapid scale-up in production at the Lordstown plant, led to major reliability and quality issues for the Cruze. In April 2011, GM announced a powertrain recall of 2,100 North American-market Cruze models following a report of the steering wheel breaking away from the steering column while the car was in motion. According to Consumer Reports, during its first year of production, the Cruze received the lowest reliability score among compact sedans [53] . In 2012, nearly a half million Cruze models built in North America were recalled due to the risk of engine fires [54] . The following year saw nearly another 300,000 Cruze models recalled due to the possibility of intermittent losses in the vehicle's brake assist feature [55] . This led to a manufacturing halt of Cruze models with 1.4-liter engines, which accounted for about 60% of all Cruze sales. GM claimed a faulty right-side axle shaft caused the brake assist problem.
Despite low reliability and major recalls, GM sold over 200,000 Cruzes in the first year, making it the highest-selling car in that segment of the market. Although the Cruze helped GM recover from market share and revenue losses, it exasperated reliability issues. Many of the Cruze's recalls also applied to other GM car models, which implies problems were being generated during the design phase as well as on the manufacturing floor. The drastic demise of GM's reputation as a reliable automaker indicates the company suffered from a larger, more widespread cultural issue.
Studies on organizational psychology and human motivation show how shortsighted decision making from leadership can generate a deep adverse impact on employee effectiveness. One of the most famous and applied theories of organizational human motivation is Maslow's hierarchy of needs [56] . Maslow surmises that human motivation stems from five increasingly important needs: physiological, safety, social, esteem, and self-actualization. These needs can be satisfied by an employer, for instance, physiological needs can be met by offering a fair competitive wage, safety through job security, esteem from a rewards and recognition program, and self-actualization by offering tailored training or development programs.
GM failed to deliver on many layers of human motivation as described by Maslow's pyramid. Ellington states that, due to the company's structure, a line executive who has been successful in implementing warranty-reduction solutions in his or her line, has no incentive to help another line executive do the same [29] . This non-collaborative behavior is prevalent at the executive level. Warranty cost reduction teams are in constant competition-they race to solve the easiest problems, are unwilling to share solutions, and are overly concerned with who will receive credit for the work. Ellington also states that ''warranty engineering has not been highly regarded in the company,'' citing limited career paths and subpar educational requirements when compared to other engineering groups [29] . Lacking a culture that promotes team collaboration and well-defined career milestones for warranty engineers, GM cannot deliver on Maslow's safety, social, and esteem needs. In contrast, General Electric (GE) and United Technologies Corporation (UTC) have been successful in implementing programs that have been shown to effectively grow employee motivation through organizational initiatives.
Former GE CEO Jack Welch, who ran the company from 1981 to 2001 instituted the ''20-70-10'' system that rewarded the top 20% of employees with financial incentives and promotion for fact-based bottom-line numbers, maintained the status of the average 70% of workers, and laid off the bottom performing 10% [57] . Although a controversial program, Welch managed a 28-fold increase in earnings (and a 5-fold increase in revenue) during his 20-year tenure as CEO [58] .
UTC applies human motivational principles in its employee-centered program, Achieving Competitive Excellence (ACE). The program ensures each employee has the right education and competency for his or her job through training and tracked development plans, and by collecting anonymous feedback. In the decade following its implementation, ACE was estimated to save $5 billion annually through increases in operational efficiency and overhead reduction [59] . The slogan coined by ACE's founder, Yuzuru Ito, ''the human heart (spirit) makes a quality product,'' neatly sums up the management insights missed by GM's leadership.
GM's eagerness to compete with Asian automakers, together with the need to start turning a profit following its government bailout, led to a series of short-sighted decisions that would have long-term, adverse consequences. Although fault cannot be found with GM's desire to re-establish its once dominant presence in the U.S. auto market, the company's strategy to increase production while reducing cost was not well executed. Instead of focusing on developing and rewarding talented employees, GM employed demoralizing ''quick-fixes'' such as laying off employee, removing employee incentive programs, and reducing salaries. These actions have a deep, tangible impact on company culture and operational effectiveness. Consequently, reliability issues have continued to plague GM. As recently as August 2017, GM issued a recall of nearly 700,000 Chevy and GMC trucks due to software glitches that disable electric power steering assistance [60] .
It is doubtful that GM can maintain a competitive footprint while coping with the high costs of warranty curtailments due to poor reliability. Hence, GM must first address its beleaguered culture if it wants to reclaim its reputation as a world-class automotive manufacturer.
V. CONCLUSIONS
GM claims that it reduced its powertrain warranty because it was not a strong marketing tool, although the declining reliability of its product is more likely the root cause, as noted by the numerous and massive recalls and lack of leadership in addressing them. These recalls, combined with the pressure to keep up with Asian automakers and stay profitable, forced GM to reduce its powertrain warranty.
When GM dialed back its powertrain warranty in 2015, it stated that ''free scheduled maintenance and warranty coverage'' are not driving factors in consumers' decision to purchase non-luxury brands [7] . However, in the year following the decision, GM saw decreases of 2.2% and 1.4% in sales of its GMC and Chevrolet brands, respectively, with the newly reduced powertrain warranty. Conversely, in that same car segment, sales for GM's main Asian competitors (Toyota, Hyundai, and Honda) grew.
Hyundai has seen steady growth and consumer loyalty since it implemented the industry-first 10 years/100,000 miles powertrain warranty in 1998, a package it still offers [61] . On the other hand, FCA followed GM's move a few months later and reduced its 5 years/100,000 miles powertrain warranty to a 5 years/60,000 miles warranty ''to be more consistent with industry practices'' [62] . Interestingly, while GM and FCA ranked first and fourth, respectively, in total automobiles recalled from January 2014 to November 2014, Hyundai did not even rank in the top 10 [63] .
Following the 2009 government bailout, GM appeared desperate to compete with the Asian automakers that had gained 10 points of market share during the first decade of the new millennium. In response to intense competition, GM's leadership decided to continue pursuing an aggressive production schedule of new, highly fuel-efficient car models. This followed an extended period of plant closures and production scale-down, which included massive layoffs, reduction of compensation, and removal of incentives. These actions have resulted in unprecedented quality and reliability issues. GM's 2014 annual report shows its financial liability due to warranty claims, which was under $650 million in 2013, swelled to about $2.9 billion in 2014 [64] . The long-lasting impact on the operating culture at GM is still evident, as recent recalls show.
Analyzing GM's recalls and actions in response to competitor offerings, the decision to reduce the powertrain warranty can be attributed to the company's poor reliability rather than the lack of consumer interest. The scale back of warranty coverage from 5 years/100,000 miles to 5years/60,000 miles indicates GM is no longer confident in the reliability of its automobiles.
